




Technology-Induced Errors and Adverse Event Reporting in an Organizational
Learning Perspective
Vinther, Line Dausel; Jensen, Christian Møller; Hjelmager, Ditte Meulengracht; Lyhne,
Nicoline; Nøhr, Christian
Published in:
Building Capacity for Health Informatics in the Future







Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Vinther, L. D., Jensen, C. M., Hjelmager, D. M., Lyhne, N., & Nøhr, C. (2017). Technology-Induced Errors and
Adverse Event Reporting in an Organizational Learning Perspective. In F. Lau, J. Bartle-Cla, G. Bliss, E.
Borycki, K. Courtney, & A. Kuo (Eds.), Building Capacity for Health Informatics in the Future (pp. 358 - 363). IOS
Press. Studies in Health Technology and Informatics Vol. 234 https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-742-9-358
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Technology-Induced Errors and Adverse 
Event Reporting in an Organizational 
Learning Perspective
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MAGERa, Nicoline LYHNEa, Christian NØHRa
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Abstract. This paper addresses the possibilities of evaluating technology-induced 
errors, through the utilization of experiences of the Danish adverse event reporting 
system. The learning loop in the adverse event reporting system is identified and 
analyzed, to examine which elements can be utilized to evaluate technologies. The 
empirical data was collected through interviews and a workshop with members of 
the nursing staff at a nursing home in Aalborg, Denmark. It was found that, the 
establishment of sustainable feedback learning loops depends on shared visions in 
the organization and how creating shared visions requires involvement and 
participation. Secondly, care workers must possess fundamental knowledge about 
the technologies available to them. Thirdly comprehensive classification of 
adverse events should be established to allow for a systematic and goal directed 
feed-back process. 
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1. Introduction
Information technologies have increasingly been integrated in the work procedures in 
the Danish nursing sector. These technologies are implemented to support staff in the 
daily practice as well as taking over various nursing tasks hitherto handled by staff [1].
To prevent staff from making errors and to support patient safety, a large amount 
of standardized procedures is inscribed into the nursing practice. Another solution is 
the implementation of healthcare technology that assists health care professionals in 
their practice. When introducing new technologies, it is well documented that new 
kinds of errors can occur. These have been described as technology-induced errors, 
defined as errors “... that inadvertently occur as a result of using a technology”, and
“arise from: a) the design and development of technology, b) the implementation and 
customization of a technology, and c) the interactions between the operation of a tech-
nology and the new work processes that arise from a technology’s use” [1, p.62]. These 
should be recognized and handled in order to maintain patient safety.
In many countries, an adverse event reporting system (AER-system) is used to 
identify, analyze and learn from errors that occur in the health care sector and in nurs-
ing practice [2]. To achieve the goal of learning from errors a feedback loop must be 
completed [3]. Any obstacle to the information exchange on the route from the occur-
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rence of an adverse event until the processed knowledge about the event has returned to
the local environment will reduce or inhibit the learning outcome.
In this study we have mapped out the Danish AER-system and analyzed the flow of 
information to identify potential impediments. We have specifically focused on errors 
caused by or related to the use of technology and whether these can be processed as 
adverse events. The aim of the study was to understand the feedback mechanisms in the 
reporting system, to identify potential and actual obstacles, and possibly to design im-
provements to enhance the learning process.
2. Material, Theories and Methods
2.1. Material
The Danish AER-system facilitates a learning cycle on three different levels: within the 
municipal organization, among similar organizations in the Region, and on a national 
level [2]. This study focus on the internal municipal organization. A learning cycle 
starts with the reporting of an adverse event through an online platform. The staff in a 
local institution as well as clients/patient and patient relatives can report experienced or 
witnessed events. The reports are send to a risk manager who screens and categorizes 
the severity of the adverse event as: “no harm”, “mild”, “moderate”, “serious”, or 
“death”. In case of “no harm”, “mild”, or “moderate” the case is categorized and closed 
by a decentralized caseworker, which could be the manager of the local health care 
institution. If categorized as “serious” or “death” the risk manager will initiate a root 
cause analysis. All cases are here after anonymized and send to the National Agency 
for Patients’ Rights and Complaints where they are compiled to national statistics and 
published in an annual report [4]. The specific empirical field for the case study was a 
Danish nursing home, and the analytical focus was to understand the staffs’ perception 
and initiatives related to organizational learning of technology. This knowledge was 
juxtaposed with the use and functions of the Danish AER-system. These two analyses 
were afterwards discussed in the context of E. Wenger’s [5] stewarding competences 
and Peter Senge’s [6] organizational learning theory.
2.2. Theoretical Background
AER-systems are complex system with contradictory interests among many actors,
who all have to cooperate before the feedback loops can be closed, and for the AER-
system to serve its purpose. Thus the theories of organizational learning provides ideas 
and concepts that are useful when elucidating and examining AER-systems.
For this investigation Peter Senge’s [6] five disciplines for the learning organiza-
tion and Chris Argyris’ and Donald A. Schön’s [3] theory of loop learning was utilized. 
Senge’s five disciplines: personal mastery, team learning, mental models, shared vi-
sions and systems thinking, constitute a set of skills necessary to cultivate an organiza-
tion’s learning competencies. For this analysis, they were used as a tool for systemati-
cally analyzing the learning potential within the healthcare institutions.
To address the different levels of learning found within in the AER-system, the 
theory of loop learning was applied to investigate if and how the AER-system supports 
a learning loop, which allows learning on an organizational level rather than merely on 
an individual level. As this opens up for a breakdown of the various learning loops in 
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the AER-system, viewing the system in the light of loop learning allows for the identi-
fication and understanding of the best possible learning cycle.
By applying and identifying these loops within the AER-system along with Senge’s 
five disciplines, it provides a way of systematically identifying insufficiencies in the 
AER-system’s learning cycles and feedback loops. Thereby enabling the identification 
of areas that needs improvement and leads the way to finding constructive solutions.
2.3. Method for Data Collection
The study was conducted as a case study, and data was collected at a nursing home in 
Aalborg, Denmark. Due to privacy regulations, it was not possible to get access to re-
ported adverse events or observing the AER-system in use. To gain insights into the 
use of the AER-system at the nursing home, interviews was conducted with six of the 
staff members, the nursing home manager, a representative for the municipality, and 
the local risk manager. The interviews were voice recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Furthermore, we organized a workshop and observed a staff meeting where the topic 
was addressed. These were documented through field notes and posters with drawings 
and sticky notes produced by participants. 
3. Results 
3.1. Levels of Learning
It was found that different ways of acting upon errors that occur, affect the possible 
level on which learning can happen in the organization. The initial reaction from staff
when noticing the error includes correcting the mistake and getting the situation under 
control, which entails single loop learning where only the involved staff learn about the 
specific situation. To reach a state of learning on an organizational level, double loop 
learning is necessary [3]. It entails reflecting upon why the error occurred and how this 
knowledge can be used to change the conditions in which the error happened. Report-
ing the errors in standardized ways like the AER-system as well as sharing the experi-
ence of errors with colleagues were found to be different ways of ensuring learning on 
an organizational level with their respective challenges.
We found that four main aspects were important in order to ensure learning on an 
organizational level: (1) accountability, (2) technological literacy, (3) a shared vision 
about the technologies in use and (4) dialog and discussions to establish shared visions 
and build new solutions. These became apparent in different steps of the reporting.
3.1.1. Reporting via AER-System
The present study indicates that accountability is a central embedded value in the sys-
tem [7]. It was found to be pivotal in relation to both pushing and pulling healthcare 
professionals to utilize the system [8], especially in the first stage where the error is 
reported. Being obligated by law to report adverse events push the healthcare profes-
sionals towards reporting. A staff member explained how it also lead him to be more 
reflective about his work practice. Furthermore, the goal of being able to clarify and be 
upfront about errors and thus establish a basis for both local staff and others for learn-
ing from the errors pulls them towards reporting adverse events. Present day, the re-
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porting of adverse events is primarily focused on events related to work practice, with 
only a few reported events concerning technology-induced errors. This could, to a great 
extent, be ascribed to the technological literacy of the reporting healthcare profession-
als.
Three types of staff at the nursing home were significant: regular staff, technology
key persons and the nursing home manager. We found that the technological literacy 
for some challenged their ability to recognize the values and usefulness of healthcare 
equipment in the work of providing care for residents. For the manager it was obvious 
how the use of various healthcare technologies would improve the care provided to 
residents. The technology key persons had received extra training in relation to the spe-
cific technologies and some of those thereby also obtained an understanding of the ad-
vantages of the technologies in their work. However, several interviewed informed 
about a tendency amongst staff to deselect the use of the technological solutions in care 
activities when experiencing residents being nervous or uncomfortable, and so they 
refrained from pushing the residents into doing something they did not want to. A staff 
member explained: “I think it is difficult to push residents to use the electronic toilets, 
if they do not like to use it”. She did not see the health related benefits of this encour-
agement, being greater than the discomfort of pushing the residents to use it. 
3.1.2. Classification 
Second step in adverse event managing is the classification of the event. Here the re-
ported events are screened and analyzed by a risk manager who makes a judgment on 
what further actions are required.
A significant difficulty in classifying the reported events was the lack of proper de-
scription of the healthcare technology involved. The necessity of considering the tech-
nological literacy while evaluating and classifying the events, becomes central for the 
AER-system to fulfill its purpose. However, both the risk managers and the reporting 
staffs’ way of thinking while evaluating must be changed, so the focus on technology 
as a possible actor in adverse events are considered. It was explained by the risk man-
ager that, reported adverse events that does not involve a resident or patient, do not fit 
the criteria for being an adverse event, and will therefore be discarded. Hence the tech-
nology-induced errors with no obvious relation directly to a resident will not be detect-
ed and evaluated in the system.
3.1.3. Processing and Closing the Adverse Event Report
When processing and closing the reported events, organizational learning is carried on 
based on the classification. The caseworker who closes the event is responsible for 
sharing his/her experiences and enable the learning process. When striving towards 
learning from technology-induced errors, we found different aspects of organizational 
learning to be essential to keep in mind. “Key persons” assigned to various technolo-
gies were found to be a means of disseminating learning through a ripple effect at the 
nursing home. They are responsible for the training of other staff members in the use of 
the specific technology. Thereby also informing about the new possibilities the tech-
nologies bring about when providing care. However, it was found that the shared vision
between key persons were challenged, in relation to what extra tasks and responsibili-
ties the role implies. For instance, some key persons were highly committed to share 
their knowledge and enroll other staff members in the vision and explained the role 
clearly in interviews. A staff member explained the role to include: “(…) having an 
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overview, a positive approach to it [technology] and chemistry with both staff resi-
dents”. Contrary others who had difficulties in acting as key persons and solely an-
swered questions when asked for advice. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion
This study addresses the learning potential of utilizing the AER-system in an organiza-
tional learning process. This naturally sets a focus on the process of reporting and en-
suring feedback.
The feedback relies on individuals reporting the discovered events, and hence the 
engagement of the individual care worker to actually carry out the reporting of adverse 
events, is crucial. When the staff in the organization share the same vision and enthusi-
asm about the care work it will affect the reporting of adverse events. Shared visions in 
organizations often derive from the top, but it is essential to avoid forcing the visions
upon the staff, but rather associate it with the personal visions of the staff [6].
According to Peter Senge [6] a learning organization should be able to share and
accomplish such learning as a ‘ripple effect’ depending on both personal skills of the 
healthcare professionals and collective skills as an organization with a shared vision 
and strategy of learning. 
Generating sense of accountability is a value to strive for in an organization as it 
can contribute to enhance reflection and thus continuous improvement and learning [7].
We found that a focus on technological literary and the role of technologies in the work 
practice is imperative in order to create a sense of accountability in relation to technol-
ogy-induced errors. Encountering an omission to use a specific device or system should, 
in situations where it impairs the provided care, likewise be reported as an adverse 
event.
In summary, the establishment of sustainable feed-back learning loops is depend-
ing on shared visions in the organization. We found three fundamental challenges to 
create and maintain shared visions about how to deal with technology-induced errors. 
Firstly, the shared visions cannot be imposed on the care workers from the manage-
ment – it must be created through involvement and participation [6]. Secondly, the care 
workers must possess fundamental knowledge about the technologies available to them. 
In our case study it is the responsibility of the technology key persons, however it 
could be organized differently. Thirdly, a comprehensive classification of adverse 
events should be established to allow for a systematic and goal directed feed-back pro-
cess. Magrabi et. al have created a useful framework for such classifications [9].
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